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INTRODUCTION

The corporate scandals that marred the beginning of this decade
taught certain sectors of American business several valuable lessons.
Interestingly, however, these scandals may have reserved their most
important teachings for federal law enforcement. Prosecutors at the
United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), following traditional
principles of prosecution drafted with individuals rather than
corporations in mind,1 quickly indicted executives, as well as the
corporate entities they worked for, once the depth of the corporate

* Copyright © 2007 by M. Ryan Williams.
1. See F. Joseph Warin & Peter E. Jaffe, The Deferred-ProsecutionJigsaw Puzzle: A
Modest Proposalfor Reform, ANDREWS ANTITRUST LITIG. REP., Oct. 26, 2005, at 16
(describing the "ill fit" of the DOJ's principles of prosecution to corporate scandals).
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frauds became clear.2 In a few instances, the decision to prosecute the
corporation had far-reaching collateral consequences, most notably
corporate dissolution and the loss of thousands of American jobs and
pensions.3
Weary of these consequences, prosecutors recently turned to the
extensive use of deferred prosecution agreements that allow
offending corporations to take certain steps-typically the adoption
of a compliance program, admissions of guilt, and civil fines-in
exchange for the DOJ's promise not to indict once the corporation's
compliance is verified.'
While these agreements have recently
allowed prosecutors in several divisions of the DOJ to correct
corporate behavior without imposing large collateral harm, the
Corporate Leniency Program ("the Program") designed and used by
the Antitrust Division ("the Division") of the DOJ deters criminal
behavior while also enhancing enforcement by enticing offending
corporations to come to them.
Antitrust laws are designed to "prohibit business practices that
unreasonably deprive consumers of the benefits of competition,
resulting in higher prices for inferior products and services."5 Price
fixing is a common form of antitrust activity where competing
2. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Ex-Accounting Chief at Enron Is Indicted on Six
Felony Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, at C1 (describing the former chief executive's
indictment for helping disguise Enron's financial collapse); Enron Unit Indicted over Tax
Appraisals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at C4 (describing the indictment of Enron's
broadband unit for "fail[ing] to identify millions of dollars" in equipment for property tax
purposes); Monty Phan et al., Industry-by-Industry Review: For Many, The Road to
Resurgence Is Rocky, NEWSDAY, Jan. 3, 2005, at A26 ("Symbol Technologies Inc. and
Computer Associates International Inc., which had been under investigation for
accounting improprieties for the past several years, both reached settlements with federal
authorities that avoided the harshest penalty of a corporate indictment."); Terry Savage,
Decision Too Late To Do Justice to Former Employees, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 1, 2005, at
63 ("More than 30,000 employees and partners of the giant Arthur Andersen accounting
firm were affected by the government's decision to indict the firm in the wake of the
Enron scandal.").
3. See Vanessa Blum, Government Takes New Approach to CorporateFraud,LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 23, 2005, at 4 ("Indictment and conviction helped push accounting
firm [Arthur Andersen] into ruin, putting 28,000 people out of work."); see also Jonathan
Weil, Nine Are Chargedin KPMG Case on Tax Shelters, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2005, at C1
(noting Attorney General Alberto Gonzales's statement that the DOJ's agreement with
KPMG " 'reflects the reality that the conviction of an organization can affect innocent
workers and others associated with the organization, and can even have an impact on the
national economy' ").
4. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Deferred Prosecution: Has It Gone Too Far?, NAT'L L.J.,
July 25, 2005, at 13 (discussing federal law enforcement's increased use of deferred
prosecution agreements and terms usually included as part of them).
5. ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE
CONSUMER 1 (2006), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/div-stats/211491.pdf.
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companies secretly agree to charge the same amount for a certain
good or service, allowing that price to remain artificially high.6 At

least one estimate indicates that price fixing "can raise the price of a
product or service by more than 10 percent, sometimes much more,
and that American consumers and taxpayers pour billions of dollars
each year into the pockets" of antitrust violators.7 This is why the

Corporate Leniency Program is such an important tool for law
enforcement.
The Program operates rather simply. The Antitrust Division
grants automatic and complete amnesty to the first corporation
engaging in anticompetitive activity that comes forward with
information incriminating the corporation's co-conspirators. 8 The
Division then uses this information to indict and prosecute antitrust
cartels whose members lose the race for amnesty.9

This process

provides the Division with information and evidence its resources
might not otherwise permit it to obtain, simultaneously deterring
anticompetitive activity and cooperation among corporations who
know it only takes one conspirator running to the Division to bring
down all of the companies involved."0 The trick, of course, is getting

that first corporation to come forward. The Division entices
corporations by providing them with a transparent leniency program
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id. at 4. DOJ investigations and prosecutions lend credence to this estimate. In
the late 1990s, the DOJ uncovered a vast conspiracy involving several corporations to fix
not only the price of vitamins, but also how many vitamins each company would
manufacture and which food production companies would receive them. Id. As the DOJ
notes, this agreement meant that "every American consumer-anyone who took a
vitamin, drank a glass of milk or had a bowl of cereal-ended up paying more so that the
conspirators could reap hundreds of millions of dollars in additional revenues." Id. One
of the defendants in this case, Hoffman-La Roche, ended up paying a $500 million fine
while some of its top executives served prison sentences. See SCOTT D. HAMMOND, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DETECTING AND DETERRING CARTEL ACTIVITY THROUGH AN
EFFECTIVE LENIENCY PROGRAM 3-4 (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/speeches/9928.pdf (discussing the need for harsh penalties for violators in an
effective antitrust leniency policy).
8. ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY 1-3
(1993), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf (describing the
conditions a corporation must meet to be eligible for corporate amnesty); see HAMMOND,
supra note 7, at 2 (" [A]mnesty is automaticif there is no pre-existing investigation.").
9. GARY R. SPRATLING, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CORPORATE LENIENCY
POLICY: ANSWERS TO RECURRING QUESTIONS 4 (1998), available at http://www.usdoj.
("In the graphite electrodes investigation, the
gov/atr/public/speeches/1626.pdf
cooperation of an amnesty applicant led to the ... cracking of another international cartel
.... In this case, the amnesty company paid zero dollars in fines, and the company next in
the door after the amnesty applicant paid a $29 million fine.").
10. See HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 5 ("This 'winner-take-all' approach sets up a race,
and this dynamic leads to tension and mistrust among the cartel members.").
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and application process. It is this dependency on transparency that
makes the Division's pursuit of its recent victory in Stolt-Nielsen, S.A.
v. United States" so perplexing.
Stolt-Nielsen went to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit on the Division's challenge to a district court ruling that
a corporation alleged to have breached its leniency agreement was
constitutionally entitled to a pre-indictment hearing on that breach. 2
The Third Circuit reversed this ruling, holding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains no such right. 3 Thus,
corporations applying for amnesty must now do so knowing that the
Division's unilateral declaration that they breached their leniency
agreement will subject them to criminal indictment.
This Recent Development argues that the Antitrust Division's
decision to deny corporations accepted into its Program a preindictment hearing on the alleged breach of its agreement to
cooperate undermines the effective enforcement of federal antitrust
law. Part I describes the genesis of the Division's current Program,
detailing how the Division's focus on transparency made its revised
Program a successful tool for enforcement. Part II introduces StoltNielsen's entry into the Program and the circumstances leading to the
Division's decision to prosecute. This Part first discusses the district
court's decision in Stolt-Nielsen and concludes with an analysis that
highlights the vulnerabilities of the Third Circuit's reversal and
reasoning. This Part also provides a sound legal rationale for
granting corporations pre-indictment hearings as a matter of
constitutional right. Part III establishes the policy rationale for
providing pre-indictment hearings, focusing on how the Division's
denial of this process will likely undercut its Program and the
enforcement of antitrust law. Part IV urges the Division to amend its
Model Leniency Agreement to include a contractual right to a preindictment hearing. Part IV then concludes by suggesting some other
minor revisions designed to enhance transparency and provide
offending corporations the certainty they need to come forward with
evidence of anticompetitive activity.

11. 442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 494 (2006).

12. See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 553, 560 (E.D. Pa. 2005)
("We agree that SNTG is entitled to a decision before the government pursues a
prosecution because if an indictment were later determined to have been wrongfully
secured, it would be too late to prevent the irreparable consequences."), rev'd, 442 F.3d
177 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 494 (2006).
13. Stolt-Nielsen, 442 F.3d at 187.
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I. THE ANTITRUST DIVISION'S CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM

The Antitrust Division of the DOJ made three significant
revisions to its Corporate Leniency Program--also referred to as "the
Corporate Amnesty or Corporate Immunity Program"n--n August

The goal of these revisions was to "increase the
of 1993.
opportunities and raise the incentives for companies to report

criminal activity and cooperate with the Division."15 The first revision
made "amnesty ... automatic if there [was] no pre-existing
investigation" into the first company coming forward.16 This policy
was a change over the old one, where coming forward merely made a
company eligible for amnesty, but prosecutors retained a great deal of

discretion as to who would receive amnesty from prosecution. 7
While "automatic," one must take particular note that the Program
grants leniency only to the first corporation to come forward. 8 Thus,
if a price-fixing cartel has five members-A, B, C, D, and E-and A
comes forward on Monday, A receives amnesty. Even if B comes
forward only one hour after A, B is still subject to full prosecution.
The second revision to the Program created "alternative"
amnesty. 19 Whereas the beginning of an investigation automatically
made a company ineligible for amnesty under the pre-1993 Program,
the policy was revised to permit companies to be eligible for amnesty,
though not guaranteed it, even after an investigation was underway.20
The third and final change stated that "if a corporation qualifies for
automatic amnesty, then all directors, officers, and employees who
come forward with the corporation and agree to cooperate also
receive automatic amnesty."21
The Division also pursued increased participation and
effectiveness through the use of enhanced criminal fines and penalties
for those who lost the race for amnesty. Passed in June of 2004, the

14. ANTITRUST DIv., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 1.
15. SPRATLING, supra note 9, at 2.
16. HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 2. The Division's Program defines "amnesty"
broadly "to mean a complete pass from criminal prosecution and zero dollars in fines for
the anticompetitive conduct." Id. at 2 n.1. Restitution to victims of the conduct is,
however, still required. Id. at 2.
17. Id. at 1.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id. at 2.
20. See SPRATLING, supra note 9, at 1 (discussing features of the revised Amnesty
Program).
21. HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 2.
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Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 200422
("the Act") made serious cartel offenses such as price fixing felony
crimes.2 3 In addition, the Act raised the statutory maximum prison
sentence for individuals from three years to ten years and increased
24
the maximum Sherman Act fine for corporations to $100 million.
The Division also made it clear that if a company becomes aware of a
second offense in an "Amnesty Plus" situation-where an
investigation has already begun and the company then chooses to
come forward-4he Division "will urge the sentencing court to
consider the company's and any culpable executive's failure to report
25
the conduct voluntarily as an aggravating sentencing factor.,
Furthermore, the Division will subsequently "request that the court
impose a term and conditions of probation for the company [while
pursuing] a fine or jail sentence at or above the upper end of the
Sentencing Guidelines range. '"26 As significant as the policy revisions
and the use of enhanced penalties have been, however, speeches and
statements by leading Division administrators point to a fundamental
shift in focus when explaining the Program's success.
These administrators note that the "final hallmark of both an
effective Amnesty Program and an anti-cartel enforcement program

22. Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 665 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV
2004)).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 2004) ("Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony .....
24. Id.
25. SCOTT D. HAMMOND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORNERSTONES OF AN
EFFECTIVE LENIENCY PROGRAM 17 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/speeches/206611.pdf. The United States Sentencing Guidelines ("the Guidelines")
provide a base sentence, in a term of months, for certain offenses or violations of federal
law. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2 (2004). The Guidelines also
prescribe enhancements or downward departures from those base sentences for certain
types of behavior or factual circumstances. See, e.g., id. § 3A.1 (enhancing sentences
imposed when a defendant chooses a victim due to the victim's race, color, religion,
national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation). Part R of Chapter Two
of the Guidelines deals specifically with antitrust offenses. See id. § 2R1.1 (prescribing the
base level of antitrust offenses under the guidelines, providing a scale adjusting the offense
level based upon the volume of commerce a violation affected, and supplying special
instructions for the imposition of fines); see also Plea Agreement at 5-8, United States v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., No. CR05-0643PJH (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2005) (discussing the
application of the Guidelines and their relevant sentencing factors to defendant's plea of
guilty). The Guidelines are advisory in that a sentencing court must consider them but is
permitted to "tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well." United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005).
26. HAMMOND, supra note 25, at 17.
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is the need for transparency in enforcement policies."27 This
determination comes from the Division's cogent realization that "[i]f
prospective cooperating parties cannot predict, with a high degree of
certainty, their treatment following cooperation, then they are less
likely to come forward."28
Therefore, "transparency" means
certainty, and in the context of an effective amnesty program
"certainty" means offering offending corporations a clear path to
non-prosecution through a process that allows them to determine
exactly what the consequences of their decision will be prior to
coming forward. Recognizing the importance of transparency, the
Division made this concept the focal point of its Program by
abdicating prosecutorial discretion and adopting a more flexible
cooperation standard.
The Division's abdication of the prosecutorial discretion it
exercised under its pre-revision Program was the key to eliminating
the uncertainty preventing offending corporations from applying for
amnesty. The policy tool that implements this abdication is the
Program's grant of automatic amnesty to qualifying corporations.29
Of course, this provision is not without its costs. Director of Criminal
Enforcement Scott Hammond has frankly stated that the Division has
had to "swallow hard on a number of applicants that we would have
preferred to prosecute." 3 Director Hammond, however, quickly
followed this statement up by noting that the Division had "roughly
15 years of experience with an Amnesty Program that was designed
to maintain a greater degree of prosecutorial discretion, and it simply
did not work. Prospective amnesty applicants come forward in direct
proportion to the predictability and certainty of whether they will be
accepted into the program."31 Thus, the Division's automatic grant of

27. HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 6 (emphasis added); see also HAMMOND, supra note
25, at 18 ("Cooperation from violators, in turn, has been dependent upon our readiness to
provide transparency throughout our anti-cartel enforcement program so that a company
can predict with a high degree of certainty how it will be treated if it reports the conduct
and what the consequences will be if it does not."); ScOTr D. HAMMOND, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, WHEN CALCULATING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF APPLYING FOR
CORPORATE AMNESTY, How Do YOU PUT A PRICE TAG ON AN INDIVIDUAL'S
FREEDOM 1 (2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/7647.pdf ("We

developed a Corporate Leniency Program that provides the ultimate prize for companies
that choose to self-report ... and we made the requirements for entering the program as
transparent and attainable as possible.").
28. HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 6.
29. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
30. HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 7.

31. Id. (emphasis added).
Director Hammond then dramatically noted that
"[u]ncertainty in the qualification process will kill an amnesty program." Id.
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amnesty to qualifying corporations represents its experience that any
program seeking cooperation requires an agency to "be willing to
for transparency-the abdication of
make the ultimate sacrifice
32
prosecutorial discretion.
The Division also enhances the transparency of its Leniency
Program through its use of a flexible cooperation standard. Rather
than requiring applicants to provide "decisive evidence" proving the
existence of a cartel to receive amnesty, the Division's policy merely
requires "full, continuing, and complete cooperation"3 3 that advances
an investigation.34
This approach, the Division notes, allows
applicants to predict with certainty whether the Division will consider
its proffer of evidence sufficient.35
The Program's revisions and their focus on transparency greatly
enhanced the Division's ability to enforce federal antitrust law,
leading Director Hammond to assert that the Program is "the single
greatest investigative tool available to anti-cartel enforcers."3 6 The
numbers support this claim. In the two-year period from 1998 to
1999, amnesty applications were received at a "rate of approximately
two per month-a twenty-fold increase as compared to the rate"
under the old Amnesty Program.37 From fiscal years 1997 to 1999, the
Division obtained "nearly half a billion dollars in criminal fines," a
number over a two-year period "virtually identical to the total fines
imposed" in the twenty years from 1976 to 1996.38 Finally, in fiscal
year 2004 alone the Division obtained $360 million in criminal fines,
including the third largest ever against a single corporation for $160
million.3 9
32. Id.
33. ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 2.
34. The "full, continuing, and complete cooperation standard" stands in stark contrast
to the more subjective "decisive evidence" standard which, "[t]o the extent potential

applicants view this standard as subjective and cannot predict the outcome of their
application, ... runs the substantial risk of dissuading potential applicants from coming
forward." HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 8.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 1.
37. GARY R. SPRATLING, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MAKING COMPANIES AN OFFER
THEY SHOULDN'T REFUSE:
THE ANTITRUST DIVISION'S CORPORATE LENIENCY

POLICY-AN UPDATE 2 (1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/

2247.pdf. This led former Deputy Assistant Attorney General Spratling to note that
"[t]oday, the Amnesty Program is the Division's most effective generator of large cases,
and it is the Department [of Justice's] most successful leniency program." Id.
38. Id.
39. SCOTT D. HAMMOND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANTITRUST DIVISION'S CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 1

(2005), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/207226.pdf.
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Realizing the uncertainty its original amnesty program created
for potential applicants and those willing to come forward and
cooperate, and desiring an increase in cooperation both to enhance
enforcement of antitrust statutes and to deter anticompetitive
behavior, the Division overhauled its program with an emphasis on
creating transparency through the abdication of prosecutorial
discretion and a flexible cooperation standard. This overhaul was
overwhelmingly successful and worked in tandem with increased
statutory penalties to garner more fines and convictions than ever
before. Such was the state of the Division's Corporate Amnesty
Program as of November 2002.
II. STOLT-NIELSEN
A.

The Story and Agreement Underlying the Litigation

On November 22, 2002, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ
"began investigating possible collusion in the parcel tanker shipping
This investigation began in response to an article
industry."4
published the same day in the Wall Street Journal,41 reporting that
Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group's ("SNTG") former general
counsel was suing SNTG for wrongful termination.4 2 Also on
November 22, SNTG executive Samuel Cooperman held a meeting
with former Division attorney John Nannes "because Cooperman was
concerned that a plaintiff's attorney claiming to have documentary
evidence of potential antitrust activity by Stolt-Nielsen had been
contacting former Stolt-Nielsen customers to solicit them to institute
Cooperman told Nannes, whom SNTG
antitrust litigation. '43
retained as counsel during the meeting, that he believed any
investigation Nannes conducted would yield evidence sufficient to
allow SNTG to apply for amnesty. 44 Despite not immediately
possessing sufficient evidence that antitrust activity occurred,
Nannes-aware of the Division's "first in time" amnesty
40. Brief for Appellant United States of America at 8, Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United
States, 442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (No. 05-1480).
41. James Bandler & John McKinnon, Stolt-Nielsen Unit Is Probed for Traffic with
Iran, WALL ST.J., Nov. 22, 2002, at A3.
42. Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 8-9; Bandler & McKinnon, supra note 41.
43. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. & Stolt-Nielsen Transportation
Group Ltd. at 8, Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (No. 051480); see also Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 553, 556 (E.D. Pa.
2005) (discussing the meeting between Cooperman and Nannes), rev'd, 442 F.3d 177 (3d
Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 494 (2006).
44. Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 556; Brief for Appellant, supranote 40, at 9-10.
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provision--sought and received Cooperman's permission to contact
the Division.45 Nannes then scheduled a December 4 meeting with
James Griffin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal
Enforcement for the Division.46
The December meeting centered on SNTG's eligibility for
leniency, but the parties disagree on what was actually said. The
Division claims that at the meeting "Nannes gave the Division six
documents dated March and April 2002 that Nannes said 'provided
unequivocal evidence or proof that the company had in fact
terminated its conduct in March and April.' ,4 Griffin allegedly told
Nannes that if the evidence of SNTG's withdrawal from the
conspiracy was " 'a head fake' " that SNTG " 'would not qualify for
leniency and even if we did enter into a conditional leniency
agreement, that that would be revoked.' "48 SNTG disputes this
assertion, claiming that "[a]lthough Nannes asserted that StoltNielsen had taken remedial steps, Nannes did not represent that
Stolt-Nielsen's participation in the illegal activity ceased as of March
2002. '49
The Division conducted its own investigation following this
meeting and subsequently granted SNTG its "marker" establishing its
place in line in the Amnesty Program on December 17, 2002.50
Nannes then began his investigation and, after obtaining evidence
that SNTG executives had exchanged and agreed to divide customer
lists in an arrangement that was per se unlawful, made his proffer to
the Division on January 8, 2003.51 The Division does not normally
require, nor did it in this case seek, evidence or an assertion of the
precise starting or ending dates of SNTG's reported conspiracy at the

45. Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 557; Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 9.
46. Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 557; Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 9-10.
47. Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 12 (quoting John Nannes).
48. Id. at 12-13 (quoting James Griffin).
49. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees, supra note 43, at 10; see also Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F.
Supp. 2d at 568-69 ("Neither Nannes nor anyone else represented that SNTG's
participation in the illegal activity had ended in March 2002."); Brief for PlaintiffsAppellees, supra note 43, at 13 (noting that Griffin's testimony "concerning the principal
contested factual issue before the district court, was not credited by the district court").
SNTG supports this claim by noting that Nannes could not have made this representation
since he had yet to conduct his investigation. Id. at 10.
50. Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 557; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 43,
at 10-11.
51. Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 558; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 43,
at 12.
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proffer. 5' Following the proffer of January 8, the Division and SNTG
executed a leniency agreement on January 15, 2003.
Less than three months after signing its agreement with SNTG,
the Division claims it learned that SNTG had continued to participate
in the anticompetitive activity "until as late as November 2002," eight
months beyond the date the Division claims Nannes represented to it
in December of 2002.1' The Division notified SNTG that it was
considering withdrawing its grant of conditional leniency in light of
SNTG's apparent breach of the agreement on April 8, 2003. 55 After
further investigation--including investigation of SNTG's coconspirators and their subsequent pleas of guilty to participating in an
illegal antitrust conspiracy in the parcel tanker industry that
continued as late as November 2002 5 6-the Division formally revoked
SNTG's leniency agreement on March 2, 2004.17
On February 6, 2004, SNTG responded by filing a complaint to
enforce its rights under the Amnesty Agreement in the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania."
The
complaint specifically sought a declaratory judgment, specific
performance, and injunctive relief in the form of (1) a preliminary
injunction to enjoin the Division from indicting SNTG until after a
hearing to determine whether SNTG had fully complied with its
obligations under its agreement with the Division, and (2)a
permanent injunction enjoining the Division from indicting SNTG at
any point.5 9

52. See Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 558; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note
43, at 12; see also Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Model Amnesty Agreement, in
SPRATLING, supra note 37 [hereinafter Model Amnesty Agreement] (providing terms of

model leniency agreement).
53. See Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 558; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note
43, at 12.

54. Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 15.
55. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 43, at 20-21.
56. The successful prosecution and guilty pleas of SNTG's co-conspirators began in
September of 2003. This success, based on facts and evidence that would have otherwise
been unknown to the Division, circumstantially supports SNTG's claim that it fully

cooperated throughout the investigation. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 43,
at 22-23; see also Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 568 ("DOJ acknowledges that the

prosecutions as a result of SNTG's cooperation were successful.").
57. Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 559; Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 17-18.
58. Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 559; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 43,
at 23.
59. Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 3.

2007]

B.

ANTITRUST LENIENCY PROGRAM

The Decisions

1. The District Court's Recognition of a Due Process Right to a PreIndictment Hearing
The district court issued its ruling on January 15, 2005, reaching
two primary conclusions on the evidence and law before it: (1) "due
process dictates that a court must decide whether there has been a
breach of [an immunity agreement] before it can be voided, and the
decision should be made before indictment," and (2) "SNTG
performed its obligation under the agreement when it supplied DOJ
with self-incriminating evidence that led to the successful prosecution
of SNTG's co-conspirators."6 Based on these conclusions, the court
enjoined the Division from indicting SNTG for its role in the antitrust
conspiracy.6
The court's opinion first addressed SNTG's argument that the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment required a preindictment hearing on its alleged breach of its agreement with the
Division.62 Relying on the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States
v. Meyer,63 the district court agreed.64 The court quoted Meyer for the
proposition that " 'the preferred procedure, absent exigent
circumstances, would be for the government to seek relief from its
obligations under the immunity agreement prior to indictment,' "65
noting that the Meyer court's reasoning on this issue rested on the fact
"that the burden on the government to obtain a pre-indictment
judicial determination is minimal because the government must
eventually obtain one."6 6 The district court signaled its agreement
with this reasoning in its concluding statement on the issue:
[T]he government's interest will not be significantly
compromised by a judicial proceeding and decision prior to
indictment rather than later after the other party's interest will
60. Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 555 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 562-63.

62. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 43, at 46-47 (citing cases for the
proposition that "[d]ue process compels the government to prove to a court that the
defendant breached the terms of the agreement").
63. 157 F.3d 1067 (7th Cir. 1998).
64. Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 560-61.
65. Id. (quoting Meyer, 157 F.3d at 1077) (emphasis added).
66. Id. A judicial determination on breach is necessary in every instance because
"due process 'requires prosecutors to scrupulously adhere to commitments made to
suspects in which they induce the suspects to surrender their constitutional rights in
exchange for the suspects giving evidence... implicat[ing] themselves.' " Meyer, 157 F.3d
at 1076 (quoting United States v. Eliason, 3 F.3d 1149, 1153 (7th Cir. 1993)).

986
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have been adversely affected. If the court determines that DOJ
is correct that SNTG breached the agreement, DOJ can indict.
If not, SNTG will have been saved from being wrongfully
indicted and harmed as a result.67
The second portion of the district court's opinion addressed
SNTG's alleged breach of its leniency agreement with the Division.
The Division argued that SNTG violated the terms of the agreement
between the two parties in that: (1) the agreement contained an
express representation by SNTG that it " 'took prompt and effective
action to terminate its part in the anticompetitive activity being
reported upon discovery of the activity,' " when in fact SNTG
continued to participate in such activity beyond the "discovery"
date, 68 and (2) " 'SNTG explicitly agreed to provide full, continuing,
and complete cooperation, including providing a full exposition of all
facts known to SNTG relating to the anticompetitive activity being
reported,'" when in fact SNTG had failed to report its ongoing
participation in the activity being reported.69 The district court
summarized the Division's argument by stating that the Division's
"justification for revoking SNTG's amnesty is that SNTG
misrepresented when its participation in the anticompetitive activity
7°
had ended.
SNTG responded to the government's argument by focusing on
the term "discovery," noting that no discovery date was stated in the
agreement.71 In fact, the corporation argued that the only date
printed in the agreement was January 15, 2003, the date the
agreement was signed.72 Therefore, any "discovery" date in the
agreement had to be January 15, 2003, and since the Division did not
claim that SNTG participated in anticompetitive activity beyond the
January date, SNTG had not breached the agreement. SNTG
bolstered this argument by pointing to the agreement's integration

67. Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 561.
68. Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 43 (quoting Model Amnesty Agreement,
supra note 52, at 1). The key to this argument was the Division's contention that SNTG
had "discovered" the illegal activity in March of 2002, the date the Division alleged
Nannes represented to Deputy Griffin in their meeting on December 4. See Stolt-Nielsen,
352 F. Supp. 2d at 562 ("DOJ argues that March 2002 was understood to be the date
SNTG said it had discovered the anticompetitive activity and implemented prompt and
effective steps to end its participation in it.").
69. Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 43 (quoting Model Amnesty Agreement,
supra note 52, at 1).
70. Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
71. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 43, at 54.
72. Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
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clause--"[t]his letter constitutes the entire agreement between the
Antitrust Division and [SNTG], and supersedes all prior
understandings, if any, whether oral or written, relating to the subject
matter herein ''73 as a bar to any alleged oral representation made by
Nannes at the December meeting with Deputy Griffin.74
The district court agreed with SNTG's analysis on all counts.
After noting that "[n]owhere in the agreement is there a reference to
March 2002 as the date SNTG discovered the illegal activity," and
that the Division's "inartful drafting cannot inure to its own benefit
and to SNTG's detriment," the court concluded that the "DOJ
rescinded the agreement based on its own belief that SNTG had to
have ceased its participation in the illegal activity in March 2002, a
date that is not specified in the agreement. '75 The court then held
that "[w]hen an immunity agreement contains an integration clause
expressly excluding any terms other than those set forth in the
agreement, a party cannot rely on a purported implicit understanding
in order to demonstrate" a breach of the agreement.76 Therefore, the
court concluded that the Division, "especially because it drafted the
agreement, cannot depend upon a tacit understanding of what it
contends was meant during negotiations but was not memorialized in
the integrated agreement. ' 77 These two conclusions led the district
court to enjoin the Division from prosecuting SNTG for any
anticompetitive activity it may have engaged in through January 15,
2003. 78 The Division quickly filed a notice of appeal.79

73. Model Amnesty Agreement, supra note 52, at 4.
74. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 43, at 54-55 ("The Amnesty Agreement
contained an integration clause that superseded any oral or other representations
contained therein.").
75. Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 562. The district court actually went further.
After hearing and evaluating live testimony from both Nannes and Griffin, the district
court found that Nannes never made the alleged representation. See id. at 565-66
("Although he asserted during the meeting that SNTG had taken remedial steps to cease
the activity in question, Nannes did not represent that SNTG's participation in the illegal
activity ceased as of March 2002."); see also id. at 568-69 ("Neither Nannes nor anyone
else represented that SNTG's participation in the illegal activity had ended in March
2002.").
76. Id. at 562.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 562-63. The problem with the district court's opinion is that its due process
analysis did not rest on a firm judicial holding, but rather on dicta-a point neither the
Division nor the Third Circuit Court of Appeals overlooked. See infra notes 81-85 and
accompanying text. However, when applied in the context of a corporate criminal
prosecution, and to the specific and recurring problems posed by poorly drafted plea and
immunity agreements, it appears that the district court's constitutional calculus makes
more sense than that of either the Division or the Third Circuit.
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2. The Third Circuit's Reversal
The district court's conclusion that due process required the
Division to seek a judicial determination of SNTG's breach of its
immunity agreement prior to indictment relied heavily upon the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Meyer. The district
court cited Meyer for the proposition that due process compels the
government " 'to seek relief from its obligations under [an] immunity
agreement prior to indictment.' "80 The problem for the district court
was that it quoted the foregoing phrase while glossing over the
Seventh Circuit's notation that a pre-indictment hearing on breach is
the "preferred procedure" when the government seeks to avoid its
obligations, not the procedure required by the Fifth Amendment.81
As the Division pointed out in its brief to the Third Circuit, the court
in Meyer "expressed a preference for a pre-indictment hearing in
dictum ... [but] its actual holdings reflect the reality that there is no
such right."82
The Division's characterization is accurate. Before expressing its
preference for a pre-indictment ruling, the Meyer court explicitly
concluded that the individual criminal defendant in that case, who
had received a pretrialhearing on the issue of breach that nonetheless
came after indictment, "received all of the protection demanded by
due process."83 The Meyer court then affirmed the defendant's
conviction despite the denial of a pre-indictment hearing.84 The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in Stolt-Nielsen expressly adopted the
Division's interpretation of Meyer in reaching the following
conclusion:
the "preferred
its dicta regarding
[N]otwithstanding
defendant was
the
procedure," the Meyer court held
constitutionally "entitled to a judicial determination of his
breach before being deprived of his interest in the enforcement
of an immunity agreement," and that this "interest" was in not
being convicted, rather than not being indicted. As the court
noted, "a post-indictment evidentiary hearing on the

79. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 494 (2006).
80. Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 560 (quoting United States v. Meyer, 157 F.3d
1067, 1077 (7th Cir. 1998)).
81. Id.
82. Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 37.
83. Meyer, 157 F.3d at 1077.
84. Id. at 1082.
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defendant's alleged breach was sufficient to
process."8 5

satisfy due

Judging by the appellate briefs filed by both sides, it appeared
that the second major issue before the Third Circuit in Stolt-Nielsen
would be whether a criminal indictment constitutes the "irreparable
harm" necessary to justify the issuance of a civil injunction. 6 The
Division's brief to the Third Circuit stressed as its first and primary
argument that "[i]njunctive relief was not warranted in this case
because ... plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law and would not
have suffered irreparable injury if an injunction had been denied.""
Presented in terms of individual criminal defendants, precedent
overwhelmingly favors the Division's position. 8 In the face of the
precedent cited by the Division,89 the district court supported its
assertion that SNTG's indictment would impose irreparable harm
only with a footnote citation to In re Fried.90 In re Fried was a Second
Circuit case that predated the Supreme Court's conclusion in
Younger and railed against interrogation techniques it deemed "foul
exploits" and "miserable misbehavior."91
The problem with the Division's analysis-as well as that of
SNTG and the district court insofar as they are both incomplete-is
that the "harm" a criminal indictment imposes on a corporation is
different in kind and scope to that visited upon an individual. While
there is little doubt that an individual suffers an injury to reputation,
in some instances even economic loss due to that injury, as a result of
a criminal indictment, the collateral, economic effects of a corporate

85. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations
omitted), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 494 (2006). In fact, the Third Circuit's agreement on this
point appears to have provided the dominant rationale for its holding since it cited Meyer
near the end of its opinion, just before noting that SNTG's contention they were entitled

to a pre-indictment hearing was "belied by precedent." Id. at 187.
86. See infra note 94.
87. Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 20-21.
88. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) ("Certain types of injury, in

particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single
criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be considered 'irreparable' in the special
legal sense of that term."); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940)

("Bearing the discomfiture and cost of a prosecution for crime even by an innocent person
is one of the painful obligations of citizenship.").
89. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 26-30 (citing seven additional cases
refuting the district court's claim that indictment alone constitutes "irreparable harm").
90. 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947).
91. Id. at 459; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 28 (referencing the
exceptional circumstances and facts of In re Fried).
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indictment are arguably much greater, and therefore "irreparable."9
Interestingly, the Third Circuit's opinion gave little consideration to
the severity of the harm imposed by a criminal indictment, dismissing
the district court's finding of "irreparable harm" to SNTG in a
footnote stating that "other courts have not accepted the argument
that the unpleasantness of an indictment brought in good faith
constitutes an injury that may 93be remedied by a pre-indictment
injunction, and neither have we."
One view of the Third Circuit's summary treatment of the issue
that both parties briefing the court believed to be so critical94 is that
the circuit court does not believe "irreparable harm" is necessary or
even relevant for the issuance of an injunction. This view is
supported by the court's notice that different circuits utilize different
tests when determining the appropriateness of issuing a permanent
injunction.95 In light of the Third Circuit's frank statement regarding
the overwhelming precedent in opposition to the district court's
conclusion and its characterization of criminal indictment as
"unpleasant[, ' '96 the better view is that the court did not see this issue
as significant to its holding once it found that precedent clearly
established that indictment does not "irreparable harm" create.
Exactly which view the Third Circuit would adhere to absent
abundant precedent to the contrary, and where the harm was much
more tangible and visited on a large number of individuals, is
significant in the analysis to come.'
92. See infra notes 111-35 and accompanying text.
93. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 185 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 494 (2006).

94. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 25-30 (placing "irreparable harm" as its
first argument and devoting six pages of argument to the topic); Brief for PlaintiffsAppellees, supra note 43, at 41-44 (devoting four pages to irreparable harm).
95. Stolt-Nielsen, 442 F.3d at 185 n.5.

96. Id.; see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
97. See infra Part II.C.

The Third Circuit did not limit its analysis of SNTG's due

process rights under its leniency agreement to its discussion of Meyer or the issue of
irreparable harm upon which this Recent Development focuses. For instance, the court
addressed the Division's argument that the separation of powers denies a court the
jurisdiction to enjoin a criminal prosecution because the executive has the "exclusive
authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case," see Stolt-Nielsen,
442 F.3d at 183 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)), as well as StoltNielsen's counterargument that this authority is not unlimited, see id. at 183-84

(distinguishing cases cited by Stolt-Nielsen as those invoking a narrow exception for the
protection of First Amendment rights). However, the court frames the ultimate issue as
"whether, even when there is no risk of a chilling effect on constitutional rights, the
existence of an immunity agreement provides federal courts with authority to enjoin a
federal criminal prosecution in order to avoid the filing of an indictment." Id. The court
then immediately turns its analysis to Meyer.
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A brief look at the underpinnings of the district court's ruling in
Stolt-Nielsen therefore makes it difficult to see why the Third Circuit
required even the limited space it devoted to the case to decide the
issues located therein. Admittedly, virtually any federal court in the
nation would likely have reached the same conclusion after
examining Meyer's dicta and the precedent holding that the
indictment of an individual does not visit an "irreparable harm" on
that person. Significantly, however, Meyer's dicta stands on powerful
reasoning, and SNTG is indeed a corporation with over 1,000
shareholders98 and not an individual. The next section probes these
lines of thought and concludes that the Third Circuit's opinion, in
light of the increased government use of immunity agreements in
ferreting out corporate crime, 99 is not as sound as it initially appears.
C. A Nuanced Approach to Stolt-Nielsen and a Corporation'sRight
to a Pre-IndictmentHearing
1. The Sound Logic of Meyer's Dicta in the Context of Corporate
Leniency
The district court's reliance on dicta is curious until one goes on
to read the reasoning behind the Seventh Circuit's "preference" in
Meyer. First, the Meyer court noted that the burden on the
government, which must seek a judicial determination of breach at
some time before or during trial," is a "de minimis inconvenience" at
best." 1 The Division's inability to supply a valid reason for not
adhering to this pre-indictment hearing process in StoltNielsen-beyond a general appeal to principles of separation of
powers'0 2 and the "public's interest in the fair and expeditious
administration of the criminal laws" 3 ---demonstrates the truth
behind the Meyer court's assertion. Second, and more significantly
for the purposes of this Recent Development, the Seventh Circuit in
98. As of May 10, 2005, all 65,279,171 Common Shares of Stolt-Nielsen,
S.A.-SNTG's parent company-were registered in the names of 1,552 shareholders.
Stolt-Nielsen, S.A., Annual Report (Form 20-F), at 103 (May 31, 2005).
99. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
100. See United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[D]ue process
prevents the government from unilaterally determining that the defendant breached the
... agreement.").

101. United States v. Meyer, 157 F.3d 1067, 1077 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v.
Ataya, 864 F.2d 1324, 1330 n.9 (7th Cir. 1988)).
102. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 31 ("[C]riminal prosecution is an
inherently executive function within the absolute discretion of the Executive Branch.").
103. Id. at 39 (citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)).
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"would

ambiguous

curtail
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agreements and, in cases in which the defendant had fulfilled his
obligations under the agreement, would help to prevent the

government from using the threat of criminal prosecution 'to achieve
by coercion what it could not achieve through voluntary
negotiation.' "104
Confronted with powerful evidence of SNTG's cooperation with
the Division,1"5 as well as its finding that Nannes never
misrepresented the discovery date of the anticompetitive activity, 106
the district court likely concluded that the interposition of a pre-

indictment hearing on breach was the only way to prevent the specific
danger alluded to in Meyer and looming behind Stolt-Nielsen's
agreement with the Division. This conclusion on SNTG's due process

rights, however, did not grant the court the authority to enjoin the
DOJ from seeking an indictment. As the Division argued on appeal,
a civil injunction required the court to conclude that an indictment
would impose "irreparable harm" on SNTG.' 7
2. Distinguishing Between Corporate and Individual "Harm"

While the Third Circuit's conclusion as to the insignificance of
"irreparable harm" is debatable in light of the other issues animating
its discussion, 8 its statement that "other courts have not accepted the
argument that the unpleasantness of an indictment brought in good

faith constitutes an injury that may be remedied by a pre-indictment
injunction"'1 9 is entirely accurate. The problem is that the cases cited
by the Division and the Third Circuit in support of this assertion all

104. Meyer, 157 F.3d at 1077 (quoting Ataya, 864 F.2d at 1330 n.9).
105. See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 553, 567-68 (entering
findings of fact regarding the DOJ's conviction of several of Stolt-Nielsen's coconspirators as a result of information SNTG provided during its cooperation with the
Division), rev'd, 442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 494 (2006).
106. See id. at 568-69 (finding as fact that "[n]either Nannes nor anyone else
represented that SNTG's participation in the illegal activity had ended in March 2002").
107. Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 20 ("Injunctive relief is never appropriate
when there is an adequate remedy at law and the moving party will not suffer irreparable
injury if an injunction is denied."). The Third Circuit dedicated very little of its opinion to
irreparable harm. First, the court was not convinced that irreparable harm was the proper
standard. See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 185 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 494 (2006). Second, as mentioned elsewhere, the Third Circuit
stated that it did not accept the proposition that the "unpleasantness" of a good-faith
indictment constitutes such harm. Id.
108. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
109. See Stolt-Nielsen, 442 F.3d at 185 n.5.

2007]

ANTITRUST LENIENCY PROGRAM

refer to the harm, reputational and otherwise, an indictment visits
upon individuals charged with criminal offenses. 1 ' Conversely, StoltNielsen and, by definition every other defendant with which the
Division enters into a Corporate Leniency Agreement, is a
corporation. Neither the parties nor the two courts involved in the
Stolt-Nielsen litigation recognized this key distinction in the very
nature of the defendant charged with a crime. This failure to
distinguish between individuals and corporations makes it impossible
to see that while an individual may not suffer the "irreparable harm"
necessary to warrant the issuance of an injunction or imposing a
requirement for a pre-indictment hearing, the harm a corporation
suffers-the harm its thousands of shareholders suffer-warrants preindictment hearings on breach.
Numerous courts have taken judicial notice of the harm an
individual suffers from an indictment.1"
These courts have
specifically noted the harm done to an individual's reputation in the
community," 2 the anxiety and inconvenience of having to defend a
criminal prosecution," 3 and the general "cost[s]" of facing an
indictment." 4 Though not explicitly referenced or explained, these
costs will likely include those of hiring counsel and preparing a legal
defense, as well as any collateral costs imposed due to reputational
harms like the loss of a job or business due to the stigma of criminal
involvement.115 These are serious costs to impose, and one could
110. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (applying "irreparable harm"
analysis to individual criminal defendant); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325

(1940) (noting the insufficiency of an individual's indictment to grant an injunction where
defendant was subpoenaed in his individual capacity and as director of a corporation);
Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying "irreparable harm"

standard for injunction to individual defendant in civil proceeding); Deaver v. Seymour,
822 F.2d 66, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying Younger holding to "federal injunctions that

interfere with state criminal proceedings" of criminal defendants).
111. See, e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 ("[C]ertain types of injury, in particular, the cost,
anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could

not by themselves be considered 'irreparable' in the special legal sense of that term."); see
also Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 27 (citing several cases addressing the
"irreparable injury" standard).
112. Deaver, 822 F.2d at 69 ("[I]t is surely true that an innocent person may suffer great

harm to his reputation and property by being erroneously charged with a crime .....
113. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46.
114. Id.
115. See Jerome Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural Revision, 51 YALE
L.J. 723, 741 n.25 (1941) (" 'But I have known rich men whose characters were ruined by
unwarranted indictments under which they were never convicted, and I have known

others who spent their every dollar and beggared their families defending indictments
which should never have been found.'" (quoting William Harman Black, The Progressof
a Criminal Case, in 7 LECTURES ON LEGAL ToPics 339, 345 (1929))).
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argue that courts have not granted them sufficient weight against the
"larger societal interests" in criminal prosecutions.1 6 That said, the

costs an indictment imposes on a corporation are far greater in that
the economic ramifications of corporate indictment are larger and are
imposed on broader segments of society that are entirely blameless.
Research has made these wider costs clear.

Event study methodology examines the movement of stock
prices due to specific events--"unexpected actions by managers or
policy-makers that are expected to affect firm values"--in an attempt
to determine the effect of these events or policy decisions on stock
prices.117

Over the past three decades, event studies have led

statistical and economic researchers to conclude that "no matter who
brings a lawsuit against a firm, be it a government entity, another
firm, or a private citizen, defendants experience economically
meaningful and statistically significant wealth losses upon the filing"
of a lawsuit against them. 118 One group of researchers made this

assertion after the statistical analysis of legal disputes consisting of
filings and settlements announced in the Wall Street Journal from
1981 through 1983.1 9 The data-representing corporate share values

in the early 1980s that are probably much greater now due to
inflation-allowed the architects of the study to specifically conclude

that the average wealth loss for a defendant corporation when a suit is
merely filed is 0.97% of the corporation's market value of the equity,

or an average of $15.96 million. 2 ' This figure alone should raise the
eyebrows of courts casually relying on precedent to conclude that a
criminal indictment does not create "irreparable harm."
116. Deaver, 822 F.2d at 69.
117. Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: PartI: Technique
and Corporate Litigation 2 (Yale Int'l Ctr. Fin., Working Paper No. 00-31, 2001), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract id=268283; see also John M. Bizjack & Jeffrey
L. Coles, The Effect of Private Antitrust Litigation on the Stock-Market Valuation of the
Firm, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 436, 438-39 (1995) (describing the use of event study
methodology to study the market effects of private antitrust suits on shareholder wealth).
118. Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Shareholder Wealth Implications of Corporate Lawsuits,
27 FIN. MGMT. 5, 6 (1998); see also Alan K. Reichert et al., The Impact of Illegal Business
Practice on Shareholder Returns, 31 FIN. REV. 67, 67 (1996) ("Using the single index
market model, the study finds that public announcements of indictments for major
corporate crimes have a significant and long-term negative impact upon shareholder
wealth, particularly for firms found guilty of the indictment."); James L. Strachan et al.,
The Price Reaction to (Alleged) Corporate Crime, 18 FIN. REV. 121, 129 (1983) ("[Flirms
involved in [criminal] acts suffer a statistically significant loss in market value of common
stock. The result is particularly striking for firms involved in alleged price fixing schemes
and those initially accused of wrongdoing.").
119. Bhagat et al., supra note 118, at 10.
120. Id. at 6.
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Significantly, however, this figure does not stand alone. In fact, a
deeper look into the study indicates that a criminal indictment, as
opposed to the announcement of a corporation's entrance into a
leniency agreement, has disastrous consequences for corporate
defendants and their innocent shareholders. Seeking to explain the
differentiated impact on shareholder wealth of lawsuits where one
side is a corporation, Professors Bhagat, Bizjak, and Coles examined
a large sample of lawsuits with an eye towards three aspects of the
litigation: (1) the corporation's opponent in the suit, (2) the type of
legal issue involved, and (3) whether the announcement involving the
corporation was a filing or a settlement. 2 '
The professors
hypothesized that these three factors largely explained the differences
in shareholder wealth effects seen following lawsuits, and the results
of their study largely confirmed their expectation. 2 2
The first major conclusion of the Bhagat study was that
"[d]efendants involved in government suits suffer larger declines in
shareholder wealth (-1.73%) than defendants involved in lawsuits
with other firms (-0.75%) or with private parties (-0.81%). "1123 This
average loss by corporations named in government lawsuits is the
equivalent of a "substantial drop in shareholder equity of $32.20
million"--as opposed to an average $16.62 million loss by
corporations named in suits with private parties-experienced when a
lawsuit is filed, an event similar to the filing of an indictment in that
both create uncertainty in regard to a corporation's financial future,
and therefore -uncertainty in the minds of investors.124 Conversely,
the data indicate that defendants in government suits suffer no
statistically significant equity loss at the announcement of a
settlement, an event similar to a firm's announcement it has entered
into a leniency agreement in that both provide certainty to the market
regarding the corporation's financial future. 125 This detailed empirical
analysis therefore provides substantial support for the proposition
that defendant corporations--specifically their shareholders and not
merely managers and employees-suffer "irreparable harm" as a
121. Id.
122. Id. at 25.
123. Id. at 6.

124. Id. at 17. The negative 1.73% average abnormal return for corporations named in
government suits has an observed value of nearly five (Z=-4.99). This means that the
observed value is essentially five standard deviations away from the expected value. The
p-value is less than 1.0% (p=0.000), meaning that the chance of getting a sample average
five standard errors away is less than 1%. In laymen's terms, these numbers are highly
significant and not the result of chance error.
125. Id. at 19.
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result of indictment, rebutting the conclusion of many courts,
including the Third Circuit.
The second significant conclusion reached by the Bhagat study is
'
that "certain types of litigation are more costly for defendants."126
The study specifically looked at the shareholder wealth effects of
actions involving breach of contract, issues of corporate governance,
environmental actions, patent infringement, and most significant
here, antitrust violations.127 The data indicated that "[a]ll but
corporate governance suits have negative returns," meaning a loss of
shareholder wealth at the time of filing.'28 This confirmed the
authors' hypothesis that the type of legal issue involved would be a
factor affecting the cost of a lawsuit and behavior in suit settlement
due to the fact that, "[f]or example, certain types of violations carry
relatively large penalties."' 29
While the data indicated that disputes involving antitrust issues
led to relatively lesser wealth losses (-0.81%) for defendant firms than
those involving environmental actions (-3.08%) and violations of
securities laws (-2.71%),13° the authors acknowledged that "changes in

the legal environment after the sample period reduce the applicability
of some of the results" found in the data.' They specifically pointed
to the 1991 changes in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Department of Defense's crackdown on procurement fraud as
support for the proposition that "government suits are even more
serious (e.g. involve more extreme wealth implications for
defendants) than even our data suggests.' 3 2 Given the substantially
increased penalties available for criminal antitrust actions,133 as well

as the Division's vigorous enforcement through the use of its
Leniency Program, one would expect the negative wealth effects of an
antitrust indictment to have grown much more severe than theywere
in the early 1980s.
The Bhagat study on the shareholder wealth implications of
corporate lawsuits, as well as the less detailed studies that preceded
126. Id. at 6.
127. Id. at 18 tbl.5.
128. Id. at 19.
129. See id. at 9 (listing other reasons that the legal issue involved in a lawsuit would
create variation in the effect on shareholder wealth to include the probability distribution
of outcomes, attorney's fees and court costs, the nature of judicial penalties, and the
applicable legal standard).
130. Id. at 6.
131. Id. at 24.
132. Id.
133. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
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provide strong, empirical evidence of the very real economic
harm that corporations experience as a result of a criminal
indictment. Equally significant is the fact that the corporations
themselves are not the only ones affected by the indictment:
hundreds to thousands of innocent shareholders suffer millions in
equity losses when the market hears of a criminal indictment for
antitrust violations. The judiciary's failure to recognize this harm to
the lives of thousands of individuals, and to distinguish it from the
serious but certainly less severe harm imposed on an indicted
individual, exposes a significant flaw in the judicial reasoning that
corporate defendants lack a due process right to a pre-indictment
hearing on their alleged breach of an immunity agreement. This
reasoning, particularly that of the Third Circuit in Stolt-Nielsen, is
further undermined, given the need to guard against the prosecutorial
overreaching identified by the Seventh Circuit in Meyer.135
The analysis to this point has focused on the vulnerabilities of the
legal argument put forward by the Division and accepted by the Third
Circuit in Stolt-Nielsen, demonstrating that there are sound legal
reasons for the Division to grant, and the courts to enforce, a
corporate defendant's right to a pre-indictment hearing on the alleged
breach of an immunity agreement. Interestingly, however, this legal
analysis does not provide the Division with the most persuasive
reason to provide pre-indictment hearings. Rather, it is the Division's
own policy interest in a transparent, effective leniency program and
the successful enforcement of the nation's antitrust laws that should
compel it to reverse course in its treatment of applicants for antitrust
amnesty.
it ,134

III. A POLICY

RATIONALE FOR PRE-INDICTMENT HEARINGS

Beginning in 1998, officials from the Antitrust Division of the
DOJ began lauding the success of the Division's Corporate Amnesty
Program in speeches addressing the antitrust bar and fellow law
enforcement agencies. 36 Several of these speeches discussed the
success of the Division's Program,137 with at least one of these
134. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 1 (addressing the International Workshop
on Cartels); SPRATLING, supra note 9, at 1 (addressing the Antitrust Section of the
American Bar Association).
137. See, e.g., HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 1 ("Over the last five years, the United
States' Corporate Leniency Program ...has been responsible for detecting and cracking
more international cartels than all of our search warrants, secret audio or video tapes, and
FBI interrogations combined."); SPRATLING, supra note 9, at 4 ("In the last six months
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speeches specifically addressing the "hallmarks" of an effective
program and how the Division's 1993 amendments to its Program led
to its success. 138 An omnipresent theme of these speeches is
"transparency" and the Division's perceptive realization that "[i]f
prospective cooperating parties cannot predict, with a high degree of
certainty, their treatment following cooperation, then they are less
likely to come forward., 139 This realization, and the success of the
Division's Amnesty Program after its implementation of a more
transparent process for leniency applicants, 140 makes the Division's
insistence upon denying pre-indictment hearings on the alleged
breach of agreements difficult to understand.
Fundamentally, a pre-indictment hearing guarantees a
corporation an opportunity to present its side of the story to a judicial41
arbiter before suffering the costly effects of a public indictment.'
This opportunity is especially important given the parameters of the
Division's Program and its own recognition of the need to abdicate
prosecutorial discretion in order to operate an effective leniency
policy.142 First, the Division's "first in time" provision requires
applicants to beat all other conspirators to the courthouse to avoid
prosecution, 4 1 meaning that corporate executives will often need to
come forward without having a full understanding of how extensive
This creates a dilemma for
the corporation's wrongdoing is.
on full display at Stolta
dilemma
to
cooperate,
companies wishing
Nielsen. SNTG executive Samuel Cooperman first contacted counsel
Nannes with only imperfect information regarding his company's
Knowing that time was of the essence, Nannes
wrongdoing.'"
immediately contacted the Division to inquire about receiving
amnesty and establishing a marker as the first conspirator to
cooperate before conducting his own investigation of the
corporation's wrongdoing. 4 The Division granted SNTG its marker
despite the fact that an internal corporate investigation had yet to

alone, the Amnesty Program has resulted in nearly a dozen convictions and over $100
million in fines.").
138. HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 1-2.
139. Id. at 6; see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 111-33 and accompanying text.
142. See HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 7 ("Prospective amnesty applicants come forward
in direct proportion to the predictability and certainty of whether they will be accepted
into the program. Uncertainty in the qualification process will kill an amnesty program.").
143. Id. at 5; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
144. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supranote 43, at 8-9.
145. Id. at 9-11.
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occur, but after its own investigation failed to turn up any
misrepresentations by SNTG. 416 The Division then attempted to
revoke the marker and leniency based on an alleged
misrepresentation made at a meeting before SNTG's counsel had the
opportunity to investigate the company's wrongdoing. 147 The lack of
a pre-indictment hearing therefore creates a catch-22 for corporations
wishing to supply the Division with evidence of criminal activity.
Eligibility requires a corporation to come forward with imperfect
information, but doing so opens the corporation up to claims that it
misrepresented its activity to the Division and therefore violated its
agreement.
The second reason the Division's refusal to provide preindictment hearings on breach undermines the certainty corporations
need to come forward is that it opens corporations up to the
prosecutorial overreaching discussed in Meyer.'4 8
Knowing an
agreement, and the parties' actions under it, will not receive judicial
scrutiny until after the filing of an indictment gives prosecutors
license to press applicants to provide information they may not have,
and to do so on an unrealistic timeline, or face the dire economic
consequences of an indictment. Stolt-Nielsen's predicament once
again illustrates the point. The Division claimed that "SNTG's
misrepresentations plus its failure to fully disclose evidence
concerning its involvement in the conspiracy similarly impeded the
grand jury's investigation and amounted to a material breach of the
Agreement."' 49
This explanation was essentially the Division's
argument that SNTG breached the agreement not only by
misrepresenting the date on which it ceased its illegal activity, but also
by failing to disclose information about the conspiracy after the date
it allegedly ended in March of 2002.15° The district court's findings of
fact directly contradict this assertion, reciting the list of convictions
the Division obtained as a result of the information supplied by
SNTG"5 ' and noting that the "DOJ acknowledges that the
146. Id. at 10.
147. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 48 n.24 (asserting that Nannes, at the
initial meeting with the Division on December 4, 2002, represented that SNTG's
participation in the illegal activity ended in March 2002). But see Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v.
United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 553, 565-66 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (finding as fact that SNTG did
not represent that its participation in the illegal activity ceased as of March 2002), rev'd,
442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 494 (2006).
148. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
149. Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 53.
150. Id. at 54.
151. See Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (detailing convictions, guilty pleas, and
fines obtained as a result of SNTG's cooperation against its co-conspirators).
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prosecutions as a result of SNTG's cooperation were successful." 5' 2

Thus, it appears the Division used its power to unilaterally declare
SNTG in breach to press for additional information, which may or
may not have been in SNTG's possession, despite clear evidence of
SNTG's cooperation. This runs completely counter to the Division's
rationale behind the removal of the "decisive evidence" standard for
applicant eligibility,153 as well as its assertion that "while an amnesty
applicant's cooperation alone may not always add up to decisive
evidence, it can provide us with leads and opportunities that will take
us to additional evidence and, ultimately, result in successful
prosecutions."' 54
Given this interest in successful prosecution,
prudence dictates examining the possible reasons the Division took
the action it did.
The Division's reasons for opposing the grant of a pre-indictment
hearing fit neatly into two pages of its brief to the Third Circuit. The
Division first claimed that allowing Stolt-Nielsen's action for an
injunction would "'encourage
a flood of disruptive civil
litigation.' "155 The Division offered no empirical support for this
assertion. Even accepting this proposition, however, does not explain
the Division's denial of a hearing. Stolt-Nielsen's civil suit for an
injunction was necessitated by the government's refusal to grant a
pre-indictment hearing on breach.'56 Therefore, the fact that a
voluntary grant of a hearing could stem any tide of civil litigation
demonstrates that this assertion is not a valid reason for the Division
to deny a hearing without a court order and as a matter of course.
The second reason the Division provides in support of its interest
in not granting a pre-indictment hearing is that this would
"impermissibly circumvent federal criminal procedure and intrude on
the prosecutorial discretion of the Executive Branch."' 57 This
statement is overbroad. Providing applicants with a hearing would
not "intrude" upon the Division's prosecutorial discretion so much as
it would delay it. More importantly, however, the Division's leniency
program was redesigned to do exactly what the Division now
complains of-abdicate prosecutorial discretion to encourage

152. Id.
153. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
154. HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 8.

155. Brief for' Appellant, supra note 40, at 38 (quoting Deaver v. Seymour, 822 F.2d 66,
71 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
156. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
157. Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 38 (citations omitted).
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applicants to come forward. 5
This justification therefore runs
counter to the Program's purpose, indicating the Division is trying to
have it both ways.
The final argument the Division supplies in support of its interest
in denying pre-indictment hearings is " 'the public's interest in the fair
and expeditious administration of the criminal laws,' and the need to
avoid disrupting and delaying criminal investigations by conducting
mini-trials on issues that should be resolved post-indictment."' 59 It is
most certainly true that in those rare instances where breach is at
issue 6 ° a delay in prosecution is likely to occur. However, this truth is
offset by two considerations. First, the delay in prosecuting the
allegedly breaching party will not necessarily delay the Division's
pursuit of an offending cartel. For example, the Division used
information provided by SNTG to prosecute SNTG's co-conspirators
both before the Division revoked SNTG's leniency and while the
parties waited for the district court's decision on SNTG's alleged
breach. 6 1 Second, any delay in prosecution must be weighed against
the costs a corporation and its shareholders face when an indictment
is issued.'62 Given the enormity of these costs and the number of
individuals upon which they are imposed, delay should not
dismissively be considered too burdensome.
The unconvincing nature of the Division's arguments as to the
denial of pre-indictment hearings leaves some room for speculation
regarding why the Division pursued SNTG the way it did. The
Division's own words fill this void. Discussing the transparency in the
Division's revised Program, and emphasizing the vital nature of
transparency in a successful leniency program, former Director of
Criminal Enforcement Scott D. Hammond noted that under the more
transparent Program the Division had been forced to "swallow hard
on a number of ... applicants that we would have preferred to
prosecute. 1 63 The misunderstanding between the Division and
158. See HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 7 ("Our Amnesty Program by its nature is
transparent because we have eliminated, to a great extent, the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in its application.").
159. Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 39 (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1, 17 (1973)).
160. The Division's revocation of SNTG's amnesty was the first of its kind under the
Corporate Leniency Program. See id. at 18 n.12.
161. See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 553, 568 (E.D. Pa. 2005)
(listing the names of indicted SNTG co-conspirators and those entering guilty pleas
beginning in September of 2003 and continuing through January of 2004), rev'd, 442 F.3d
177 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 494 (2006).
162. See supra notes 111-25 and accompanying text.
163. HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 7.
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SNTG regarding the date the latter discovered and ceased its illegal
activity no doubt left the Division feeling as though it were choking
on yet another instance of corporate wrongdoing.
Wishing to set an example for future applicants, and perhaps
angered by its view of SNTG's conduct,"64 the Division set out to
establish a precedent. Unfortunately, this precedent undermines the
program that is the " 'most effective generator of international cartel
cases' " for the Division.'65 If the Division's actions against SNTG
were indeed an attempt to deter future applicants from making
misrepresentations--rather than a punitive response to SNTG's
specific conduct-the deterrence was not necessary. The Division
candidly admitted that no applicant had ever previously "lied" or
otherwise failed to cooperate fully after gaining admission to the
program.166 This point is further evident in the fact that the Division's
allegation that SNTG breached its agreement was the first allegation
of its kind.'67 Therefore, if the Division predicated its actions on
either of the unstated rationales above, it did so to the detriment of
effective enforcement policy and in search of a solution to a problem
that does not appear to exist.
The Division's declaration of Stolt-Nielsen's breach illustrates
just two potential ways in which a leniency program that denies
applicants a pre-indictment hearing produces, rather than reduces,
uncertainty. While these two examples provide specific evidence, the
uncertainty surrounding the Division's policy is a simple matter of
intuition. Executives who suspect their corporation is guilty of
antitrust activity are unlikely to come forward for amnesty without
knowing whether their attempt to cooperate will protect them from
prosecutorial overreaching and the harm of a criminal indictment.
The substantial economic losses facing an indicted corporation 168
serve only to increase executive hesitancy, making it more likely that
corporations and their management will risk detection by an
overburdened agency rather than cooperation with one lacking a
check on discretion. In short, the Division's approach ignores its
164. See Reply Brief for Appellant United States of America at 16, Stolt-Nielsen, S.A.
v. United States, 442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2005) (No. 05-1480) ("Until this case, no leniency
applicant had ever lied to the Division about its eligibility for leniency. This separates
SNTG from the well over 100 applications for leniency (almost all of which were granted)
that the Division has received since revising its Leniency Policy in 1993.").
165. Id. (quoting HAMMOND, supra note 39, at 8-9).
166. See supra note 164.
167. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 18 n.12 ("This is the only time that the
Division has revoked a grant of conditional leniency.").
168. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
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"roughly 15 years of experience with an Amnesty Program that was
designed to maintain a greater degree of prosecutorial discretion
[that] ... simply did not work. ' 169 The result of the Division's
approach is therefore a likely return to the lack of cooperation it
experienced under its pre-revision Amnesty Program, 7" and a
corresponding drop in its ability to enforce laws designed to curb
anticompetitive activity.
Thus, in light of the Third Circuit's
holding, 7 ' the Division's interest in effective enforcement is best
served by a provision in its Model Agreement guaranteeing
applicants a pre-indictment hearing on the issue of breach, as well as
a few other transparency-enhancing revisions.
IV.

A.

SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE ANTITRUST DIVISION'S
MODEL LENIENCY AGREEMENT

A ContractualRight to a Pre-IndictmentHearing

The Third Circuit's opinion in Stolt-Nielsen deals a serious blow
to corporations applying for the Corporate Leniency Program and
seeking to assert a constitutional right to a pre-indictment hearing.
This holding does not, however, prohibit the Division from granting a
right to a hearing in its Model Agreement pursuant to the freedom of
contract. This Recent Development suggests the Division provide
applicants this right to enhance transparency and certainty,
encouraging potential applicants to come forward.
Now in an
enviable bargaining position, the Division may even tailor the terms
of the hearing to its own preferences.
The Division's primary, practical reservation regarding preindictment hearings appears to be the delay these "mini-trials" may
impose upon the investigation and prosecution of anticompetitive
behavior. 7 2 The Division could address this concern by drafting its
leniency agreements to provide expedited hearing procedures. First,
the Division could limit the time period in which an applicant could
seek a hearing upon receiving the Division's notification that it
intends to revoke its grant of amnesty. A primary source of the
Division's frustration with its situation in Stolt-Nielsen no doubt
centered on the ten-month period that elapsed between its notifying
SNTG that it was considering withdrawing conditional leniency and

169.
170.
171.
172.

HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 7.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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SNTG's filing of its complaint.'73 Providing a contractual ten-day
window in which an applicant could seek a hearing on breach would
eliminate any significant time impediment to the Division's
investigation and prosecution of the applicant.
The Division could also dictate the body or court designated to
decide the issue. Depending upon how much incentive it wished to
provide potential applicants to come forward, the Division could
adopt policies ranging from a requirement that a private mediator
decide the issue without appeal, all the way to allowing a district court
to adjudicate the claim while providing applicants a right of appeal.
Finally, the Division could even limit the scope of the adjudicating
body's inquiry and the type of evidence admissible at the hearing.
While this may sound somewhat unfair, each of the options
mentioned above are available under contract law, not as a matter of
Besides, even if these pre-indictment
constitutional principle.
procedures were immeasurably slanted in the Division's favor, the
agreement as a defense
applicant would still be permitted to assert its
17 4
activity.
criminal
alleged
their
for
at the trial
The crucial point underlying the foregoing discussion is that the
Division's determination as to how much pre-indictment process it
contractually grants applicants to its leniency program is likely to
have a direct impact on the applicants' willingness to come forward
and incriminate its co-conspirators in the first place. The Division
would therefore be wise to grant as much process as possible in the
hopes of maintaining enforcement at pre-Stolt-Nielsen levels.
B.

Secondary Amendments To Enhance Transparency

Two additional revisions to the Division's Model Agreement
would enhance transparency and encourage the cooperation
necessary for effective enforcement. The first revision involves the
insertion of a specific "discovery" date into the agreement. The
current Model Agreement includes a representation that the
applicant "took prompt and effective action to terminate its part in
'
Incredibly, however,
the activity upon discovery of the activity."175
the Model Agreement does not provide a specific discovery or
173. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 16, 18 (stating that the Division formally
notified SNTG of revocation on March 2, 2003, and that SNTG filed its complaint in
district court on February 6, 2004).
174. See Deaver v. Seymour, 822 F.2d 66, 69-70 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that criminal
defendants are afforded "a federal forum in which to assert their defenses" at trial and
after indictment).
175. Model Amnesty Agreement, supra note 52, at 1.
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termination date. 76 The Division explains this lack of a discovery
date as necessary because "neither the Division nor the applicant
seeking leniency may know the exact dates at the time the Agreement
is signed. ' 177 The Division also noted that not specifying dates allows
both parties to "focus on the real issue--did the applicant take
prompt and effective action ... upon discovery of the illegal
conduct. 1 78
The Stolt-Nielsen litigation vividly illustrated the
problem with this approach, which is that the issue of promptness is
time-dependent and cannot be determined without a definitive
starting point. That said, the Division is correct in noting that it may
take a prolonged investigation by both parties to determine the exact
discovery date. The solution is not the omission of a discovery date,
however, but rather the granting of a "marker" to hold the applicants'
place until a discovery date can be determined, agreed upon by all
parties, and included in the agreement.
This revision would have protected both parties in the StoltNielsen litigation, particularly the Division. The exact date upon
which SNTG "discovered" its illegal activity was the primary issue
before the district court regarding the agreement's interpretation. 7 9
The court concluded that in the absence of any date in the agreement,
beyond the January 15, 2003 execution date, "[tihe agreement
immunize[d] SNTG from prosecution for activity prior to January 15,
2003." °0 Reaching this conclusion was much easier given the clause
in the current Model Agreement stating that "the Antitrust Division
agrees not to bring any criminal prosecution against [applicant] for
any act or offense it may have committed prior to the date of this
letter."' 81 Thus, amending the Model Agreement to include a specific
discovery date determined after investigation, and replacing "date of
this letter" with that discovery date, would provide both parties more
certainty in regards to their obligations.

176. See id.
177. Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 47 n.23.
178. Id.
179. See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 553, 562 (E.D. Pa. 2005)
("Did DOJ and SNTG agree that the illegal conduct was discovered in March 2002, thus
triggering SNTG's obligation to withdraw from its participation in the anticompetitive
activity?"), rev'd, 442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 494 (2006); Brief for
Appellant, supra note 40, at 47 ("Thus, the relevant issue the court failed to address was:
When did SNTG discover the illegal conduct and when did it terminate its participation in
it?").
180. Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
181. Model Amnesty Agreement, supra note 52, at 2-3.
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The second revision concerns the Model Agreement's use of the
term "prosecution" in its promise "not to bring any criminal
prosecution" against an applicant in exchange for cooperation.182 The
Third Circuit's opinion in Stolt-Nielsen cited a string of cases
addressing whether a government's promise not to "prosecute"
means not to force a defendant to stand trial or not to punish.183
Though the weight of authority is that this language merely provides
protection against punishment, and therefore does not stand as a bar
to indictment and trial, 14 the language would provide all parties more
certainty if the government agreed not to "convict" the defendant
while expressly stating that the agreement does not bar indictment.
The uncertainty the Third Circuit's decision creates in the minds
of corporate criminal defendants seeking amnesty under the Leniency
Program calls on the Division to provide some assurances to these
defendants to ensure they continue to come forward at a rate similar
to that prior to Stolt-Nielsen. Providing a certain, identifiable
"discovery" date in amnesty agreements would allow corporations
wishing to cooperate to provide information without worrying about
subsequently being declared in breach and indicted. Changing the
term "prosecute" to "convict" would have a similar effect, providing
certainty and transparency and making corporations more likely to
come forward with evidence of anticompetitive activity.
CONCLUSION

Fourteen years ago the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice amended its Corporate Leniency Program, immeasurably
enhancing its ability to enforce federal antitrust law. The Division's
on transparency encouraged those engaging in
emphasis
anticompetitive activity to come forward with incriminating
information about their co-conspirators in exchange for a promise of
amnesty for their own wrongdoing. By giving up a modicum of
prosecutorial discretion, the Division, for the first time in its
Program's history, provided the incentive necessary for successful

182. Id.
183. See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 494 (2006) ("Other immunity agreements that have promised not to
charge or otherwise criminally prosecute a defendant, like the agreement at issue in this
case, have likewise been construed to protect the defendant against conviction rather than
indictment and trial.").
184. See id. (citing United States v. Bailey, 34 F.3d 683, 690-91 (8th Cir. 1994) and
United States v. Bird, 709 F.2d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 1983)).
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enforcement and deterrence. Surprisingly, the Division appears to
have reversed course with its actions and victory in Stolt-Nielsen.
The Third Circuit's decision constitutionalizes the Division's
refusal to grant corporations promised amnesty a pre-indictment
hearing in the event they are accused of breaching their amnesty
agreement. While this decision removes any constraint on the
Division's right to indict, simultaneously providing the Division
increased leverage over even those corporations with leniency
agreements in hand, it does so at a cost. Armed with the knowledge
that their corporations and shareholders can suffer the economic and
collateral effects of an indictment despite their cooperation and
without being heard, corporate executives will now think twice before
providing the Division with the information that made the lion's share
of its convictions and penalties over the past decade possible. The
Division, against its own advice and experience, has reclaimed a large
degree of prosecutorial discretion at the cost of transparency. The
only question remaining in the wake of Stolt-Nielsen is where the
Division goes from here.
The Division's interest in effective enforcement dictates a
contractual grant of pre-indictment process to corporations entering
the Leniency Program through formal agreement. The form of that
process will likely turn on the corporate reaction to the Third
Circuit's holding, as well as the Division's conduct in its aftermath.
The future success of the Amnesty Program is therefore unclear.
What is clear, however, is that the Division's failure to amend its
Model Agreement to include some form of pre-indictment process
will almost certainly lead corporate executives to run the risk of
detection rather than that of indictment at the sole discretion of the
Division, choosing the devil they know over the one they do not.
M. RYAN WILLIAMS**

** For my wife, Stacey, and my mother, Judy. Women of courage and character.
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